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Rock the Cash-bah! How Alston Presents a 
New Challenge to the Amateurism 
Justification and Ways the NCAA Can 
Modernize to Remain Afloat 
John Y. Doty 
During the last decade, antitrust litigation involving Division I 
athletes and the NCAA has resulted in changes to the NCAA’s 
rules, presenting a threat to amateurism. As athletes have voiced 
concerns about their likeness being used without permission in 
video games, the difficulty of balancing sports and academics, and 
going to bed hungry when millions of dollars in profits are being 
made off of them, the NCAA has allowed conferences and schools 
to provide student-athletes with stipends for cost of attendance 
expenses. However, even though the NCAA has modified its rules, 
athletes continue to ask for more, and courts have responded. 
Recent litigation has resulted in the expansion of athletes’ rights. 
In March 2019, U.S. District Judge Claudia Wilken declared that 
the NCAA and its major conferences are violating antitrust law by 
restricting the education related benefits athletes can receive. In 
May 2020, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit upheld Judge Wilken’s decision that the NCAA cannot 
limit the non-cash education-related benefits available to athletes 
in Division I of the Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS). 
This Comment will discuss how antitrust litigation has impacted 
amateurism. Parts III and IV will detail the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision in Alston, examine ways the NCAA can modernize to limit 
athlete exploitation, and discuss how the NCAA and student-
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Picture a Saturday morning in Ann Arbor, Michigan in late-August 
2003. The Michigan Wolverines, a top-ranked college football team, begin 
their season against a middling Central Michigan team. In front of more 
than one hundred thousand fans at its home stadium, Michigan wins the 
game by nearly forty points. The stadium is filled with fans wearing maize 
and blue, who cheer loudly throughout the game. There isn’t an empty seat 
in the house. 
Take a moment to soak in the scene described above: because the 
setting at many schools now differs significantly from what existed then. 
Since 2003, the landscape and traditions of college athletics have changed 
drastically. Notably, Division I athletes competing today are unhappy with 
the benefits the NCAA is offering them. During the last decade, student-
athletes have voiced concerns about the difficulty of balancing academics 
and athletics, comparing it to balancing two full-time jobs. 
In 2009, Ed O’Bannon, a basketball player for UCLA during the 
1990s, sued the NCAA, alleging that the use of his likeness in DVDs, 
video games, photographs, and apparel violated federal antitrust law.1 
After the Ninth Circuit decided the lawsuit in 2015, the NCAA modified 
its rules to allow schools to provide stipends to student-athletes for snacks, 
student fees, movies, and more.2 However, those overtures by the NCAA 
hardly addressed alleged antitrust violations and the dispute over pay for 
name, image, and likeness remains largely unresolved. 
This Comment will discuss how antitrust litigation has impacted 
Division I athletics. Part II will review the history of the NCAA, discuss 
its founding principles, and explain the standard of review for antitrust 
cases under the Sherman Act. Part III will discuss the NCAA’s tradition 
of amateurism and history of antitrust lawsuits. Finally, Part IV will 
analyze the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Alston3 and discuss ways the 
NCAA can modernize to limit athlete exploitation in a manner consistent 
with the collegiate model. 
 
1 Former Bruin O’Bannon sues NCAA, ESPN (July 21, 2009), 
https://www.espn.com/mens-college-basketball/news/story?id=4346470. 
2 Chris Isidore, College athletes finally getting some cash, CNN (Sept. 4, 2015, 1:43 
PM), https://money.cnn.com/2015/09/04/news/companies/extra-cash-college-
athletes/index.html. 
3 In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 958 
F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2020). 
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II. HISTORY 
A. The NCAA 
In 1852, Harvard and Yale organized the first recorded intercollegiate 
athletic event.4 By 1880, intercollegiate athletics began to assume the 
commercial nature that is present today.5 Efforts to form conferences and 
create rules began in the 1890s and continued through the beginning of the 
twentieth century.6 
In 1905, eighteen deaths and over one hundred injuries in 
intercollegiate football spurred President Theodore Roosevelt to organize 
a White House conference, where officials from major football programs 
would meet to review football rules.7 Unfortunately, the conference did 
little to lessen the toll of deaths and injuries among athletes in 
intercollegiate football.8 However, a second meeting, organized by the 
Chancellor of New York University, led to the creation of a Rules 
Committee.9 Eventually, the Rules Committee and officials from the 
White House worked together to reform the rules of intercollegiate 
football.10 The group formed the Intercollegiate Athletic Association of 
the United States, which was officially renamed the NCAA in 1910.11 
Hindered by recruiting scandals, the NCAA enacted the Sanity Code 
in 1948.12 The Sanity Code was created to “alleviate the proliferation of 
exploitative practices in the recruitment of student-athletes.”13 Within 
three years, the Sanity Code was replaced by the Committee on 
Infractions, “an enforcement body with authority to penalize members 
involved in rules violations.”14 
Two events critical to the NCAA’s development occurred during the 
1950s: (1) Walter Byers began his tenure as the Executive Director of the 
NCAA; and (2) the NCAA negotiated a multi-million-dollar contract to 
televise intercollegiate football.15 By 1952, Byers helped establish the 
 
4 Cody J. McDavis, The Value of Amateurism, 29 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 275, 287 
(2018). 
5 Id. at 288. 
6 Rodney K. Smith, The National Collegiate Athletic Association’s Death Penalty: How 





11 Id. at 991. 
12 Id. at 992. 
13 Id. 
14 McDavis, supra note 4, at 290. 
15 Smith, supra note 6, at 993. 
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enforcement division of the NCAA.16 The division was formed to work in 
tandem with the Committee on Infractions in the enforcement process.17 
With the enforcement division and Infractions Committee working 
together, and television contracts providing financial support, the NCAA’s 
role in the governance of intercollegiate athletics expanded.18 However, as 
the NCAA’s role grew, critics began to speak up.19 Some asserted that 
college athletics had commercialized to the point where it was a big 
business disguising itself as an educational enterprise.20 Others criticized 
the NCAA for enforcement regulations that were strict on some schools 
but lenient on others.21 Moreover, legislators were critical of the NCAA.22 
In 1978, Congress investigated the alleged unfairness of the NCAA’s 
procedures and processes.23 
The NCAA revised its procedures in response to the investigation.24 
However, even after amending its policies, the criticism persisted.25 
Because of this, the Presidents’ Commission organized a special 
convention in June 1985.26 At the convention, the Presidents’ Commission 
shifted control over intercollegiate athletics by adopting legislation that 
placed the Presidents and Chancellors of universities in control of the 
NCAA.27 Today, the corporate structure of the NCAA mirrors the changes 
the Presidents’ Commission made in 1985.28 The Board of Governors is 
the “highest governance body”29 and consists of twenty-five members, 
sixteen of whom are Presidents or Chancellors of universities across the 
country.30 The NCAA President, the chairs of the Division I Council, and 
the Division II and Division III management counsels are ex-facto 
nonvoting members.31 Therefore, the sixteen Presidents and Chancellors 
 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 994. 
18 See McDavis, supra note 4, at 291. 
19 See id. 
20 Smith, supra note 6, at 994. 
21 McDavis, supra note 4, at 291. 
22 Id. 
23 Smith, supra note 6, at 994. 
24 McDavis, supra note 4, at 291. 
25 Smith, supra note 6, at 994. 
26 McDavis, supra note 4, at 291. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 293. 
29 NCAA, Board of Governors, http://www.ncaa.org/governance/committees/ncaa-
board-governors (last visited Nov. 6, 2019). 
30 NCAA, Board of Governors Roster, 
http://web1.ncaa.org/committees/committees_roster.jsp?CommitteeName=EXEC (last 
visited Nov. 6, 2019). 
31 Id. 
2021] UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW 75 
 
are the only members on the board who are allowed to vote on NCAA 
legislation, with the exception that the President may vote to break a tie.32 
B. Amateurism and Founding Principles 
The NCAA was created to “eliminate unsavory violence” and 
“preserve amateurism” in collegiate athletics.33 The lack of a common 
understanding of what it meant to be a student-athlete troubled 
intercollegiate athletics in the years prior to the formation of the NCAA 
and continued to be problematic for years after.34 If fair competition was 
ever going to be achieved, the NCAA needed to establish limits on who 
could participate in intercollegiate athletics. It is through amateurism that 
the NCAA created these limits.35 
Although Article VI of the NCAA’s original constitution was written 
in part to prevent participation by non-amateurs, a clear definition of 
“amateurism” was not provided in the section.36 The need to establish a 
definition prompted the NCAA to establish a committee to define the 
term.37 In 1909, the NCAA became the first to affirmatively define an 
amateur in athletics as “one who enters and takes part in athletic contests 
purely in obedience to play impulses or for the satisfaction of purely play 
motives and for the exercise, training, and social pleasure derived. The 
nature or primary attitude of mind in play determines amateurism.”38 Since 
the beginning of the twentieth century, this definition has evolved but the 
underlying idea is still the same: “Student-athletes shall be amateurs in an 
intercollegiate sport, and their participation should be motivated primarily 
by education and by the physical, mental, and social benefits to be derived. 
Student participation in intercollegiate athletics is an avocation, and 
student-athletes should be protected from exploitation by professional and 
commercial enterprises.”39 
Today, the troubling situations with amateurism arise when the NCAA 
relies on it to justify rules limiting student-athletes’ right to compensation. 
Under these circumstances, the NCAA profits from the sale of 
merchandise, tickets, advertising, and corporate sponsorships, and uses 
amateurism to preclude student-athletes from obtaining benefits. Courts 
 
32 Id. 
33 Smith, supra note 6, at 991. 
34 See HOWARD J. SAVAGE ET AL., CARNEGIE FOUND. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF 
TEACHING, AMERICAN COLLEGE ATHLETICS 83, 87 (1929) [hereinafter CARNEGIE REPORT]. 
35 McDavis, supra note 4, at 294. 
36 CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 34, at 42. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL art. 2, 2.9, at 4 (Aug. 1, 2019) [hereinafter NCAA 
DIVISION I MANUAL]. 
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analyze challenges to amateurism under the Sherman Antitrust Act. The 
next section outlines courts’ antitrust framework and explains how 
amateurism has been challenged through the Sherman Antitrust Act. 
C. Antitrust Framework 
The primary authority under which student-athletes bring claims 
against the NCAA for restricting athlete pay is the Sherman Antitrust 
Act.40 To prevail on a claim under Section 1, a student-athlete must show 
(1) a contract, combination, or conspiracy, (2) that the agreement 
restrained trade unreasonably, and (3) that the restraint affected interstate 
commerce.41 In claims against the NCAA, student-athletes typically 
establish the first and third prongs easily.42 The NCAA rules prohibiting 
student-athletes from receiving compensation are codified in the NCAA 
Manual, satisfying the first prong.43 In addition, interstate commerce is 
affected. The NCAA is a nationally operating enterprise with member 
institutions operating in every state of the country.44 Because of this, 
claims are often decided on the second prong: whether the agreement 
unreasonably restrained trade. Courts analyze the question under one of 
the following tests or rules: (1) the per se rule, (2) the rule of reason, or (3) 
the quick look analysis.45 
1. The Per Se Rule 
Courts apply the per se rule when entities engage in practices that are 
presumptively illegal.46 Applying the per se rule analysis, courts have held 
practices such as price-fixing47, output limitations48, and division of 
markets – all of which are presumptively illegal – to be antitrust 
violations.49 
Although some find it appropriate to subject the NCAA’s rules to a 
per se rule analysis, the Supreme Court has never allowed it.50 To exist at 
 
40 Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018) (“Every contract, combination, in the 
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the 
several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”). 
41 Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1410 (9th Cir. 1991). 
42 McDavis, supra note 4, at 299. 
43 Id. 
44 McDavis, supra note 4, at 299-300. 
45 McDavis, supra note 4, at 300. 
46 See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Reconciling the Per Se and Rule of Reason Approaches 
to Antitrust Analysis, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 685, 691 (1991). 
47 U.S. v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305, 309-10 (1956). 
48 U.S. v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608-09 (1972). 
49 Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49-50 (1990). 
50 See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 101-02 (1974). 
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all, the NCAA must create and enforce rules defining, and in some cases, 
restraining the manner in which institutions compete.51 Therefore, the 
practice is not presumed to be illegal and must be evaluated under the “rule 
of reason.”52 
2. The Rule of Reason 
The rule of reason is the main framework that courts apply when 
analyzing student-athletes’ antitrust claims against the NCAA.53 Under the 
rule of reason, an agreement unreasonably restrains trade where “the 
relevant agreement likely harms competition by increasing the ability or 
incentive profitability to raise price above or reduce output, quality, 
service, or innovation below what likely would prevail in the absence of 
the relevant agreement.”54 A burden shifting framework applies.55 
First, the student-athlete must establish that the restraint creates 
anticompetitive effects within a relevant market.56 Market power of the 
defendant in the relevant market usually also must be shown, however, it 
is not required where an unambiguous detrimental effect on price or output 
exists.57 In modern antitrust jurisprudence, an “anticompetitive effect” is 
an adverse effect on price, output, consumer choice, or quality.58 Product 
and geographic markets are considered in determining whether a market 
is relevant.59 The product market includes “the pool of goods or services 
that have reasonable interchangeability of use and cross-elasticity of 
demand.”60 The geographic market incorporates the area of effective 
competition where buyers can look to for alternate sources of supply.61 
If the student-athlete establishes significant anticompetitive effects in 
a relevant market, the burden shifts to the NCAA to show that the restraint 
 
51 Id. at 100-01. 
52 Id. at 103. 
53 See McDavis, supra note 4, at 300. 
54 FTC & DOJ, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS 4 
(2000). 
55 In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 37 F. Supp. 3d 1126, 
1135-36 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
56 Id. at 1136. 
57 See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 109. 
58 See Anticompetitive Practices, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, 
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/anticompetitive-practices. 
59 Oltz v. St. Peter’s Cmty. Hosp., 861 F.2d 1440, 1446 (9th Cir. 1988); see Big Bear 
Lodging Ass’n v. Snow Summit, Inc., 182 F.3d 1096, 1105 (9th Cir. 1999). 
60 Oltz, 861 F.2d at 1446; see, e.g., Law v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 F.3d 
1010, 1018 (10th Cir. 1998) (noting that the “product” made available by the NCAA in the 
case is college basketball). 
61 Oltz, 861 F.2d at 1446. 
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has legitimate procompetitive justifications.”62 Thereafter, the NCAA 
must show that although it has imposed restraints, the procompetitive 
justification outweighs the anticompetitive harm.63 If the NCAA makes 
this showing, the burden shifts back to the student-athlete to establish that 
the NCAA’s justification could be achieved by a less restrictive means.64 
The less restrictive means must be “virtually as effective” and must come 
without significantly greater costs.65 If at any point, a party cannot meet 
its burden, it will lose.66 
3. The Quick Look Analysis 
The quick look analysis is an abbreviated version of the rule of reason 
analysis. In Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, the Supreme Court gave its seal of 
approval to the quick look analysis.67 The California Dental Association 
(“CDA”) was a non-profit organization with nearly 20,000 member 
dentists, and it had a code of ethics prohibiting false advertising with 
respect to price and quality of service.68 The Federal Trade Commission 
(“FTC”) FTC argued that these restrictions in themselves were not 
problematic but that as implemented, CDA prohibited any advertising of 
discounts and any advertising with respect to quality of services, and 
concluded that restrictions on both price advertising and non-price 
advertising would be unlawful under a quick look analysis.69 Ultimately, 
the Court agreed, concluding that this case and its predecessors opened the 
door “for what has come to be called abbreviated or ‘quick look’ analysis 
under the rule of reason.”70 However, the Court merely endorsed the 
‘quick look’ concept with this language; it declined to apply the analysis 
in this case. Specifying when this type of analysis is appropriate, the Court 
articulated that the quick look concept should be applied where “an 
observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics could 
conclude that the arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive 
 
62 In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 37 F. Supp. 3d 1126, 
1136 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
63 McDavis, supra note 4, at 301. 
64 In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 37 F. Supp. 3d at 1136. 
65 O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1074 (9th Cir. 2015) 
(citing Cnty. of Tuolumne v. Sonora Cmty. Hosp., 236 F.3d 1148, 1159 (9th Cir. 2001)). 
66 McDavis, supra note 4, at 301. 
67 Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 769-70 (1999). 
68 Id. at 759-60. 
69 Id. at 762-63. 
70 See id. at 770. 
2021] UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW 79 
 
effect on customers and markets.”71 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. 
of Regents is the first antitrust case where the Court applied this analysis.72 
Significantly, the quick look analysis is distinct from the rule of reason 
because it allows a court to short-circuit the market power inquiry in some 
cases. Market power is frequently one of the most difficult issues to 
resolve in antitrust cases and is typically the subject of expert testimony.  
Supporters of the quick look rule view it as an improvement over 
traditional rule of reason analysis for many reasons: (1) it facilitates 
deterrence by encouraging lawsuits that might otherwise be intimidated by 
the burdens of a rule of reason analysis; (2) it reduces litigation costs; and 
(3) it encourages cost savings without preventing defendants from 
presenting justifications for their conduct.73 
III. NCAA ANTITRUST LAWSUITS 
A. History 
In 1984, the Supreme Court decided Board of Regents. Supporters of 
amateurism rules assert that the case stands for the proposition that 
student-athletes should not be compensated.74 Surprisingly, the NCAA has 
relied on this decision most in defending its amateurism rules, even though 
the antitrust challenge in the case had nothing to do with amateurism. 
In Board of Regents, the Universities of Oklahoma and Georgia sued 
the NCAA, alleging that its television plan, which limited the number of 
times a member institution could appear on air, violated antitrust law.75 
The NCAA adopted its first restrictive television policy in 1951, after a 
study revealed that television has “an adverse effect on college football 
attendance and unless brought under some control threatens to seriously 
harm the nation’s overall athletic and physical system.”76 In 1979, after 
 
71 Id. 
72 In Board of Regents, Justice Stevens commented that the quick look “can sometimes 
be applied in the twinkling of an eye.” Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 
468 U.S. 85, 109 n.39 (1974). 
73 Alan J. Meese, In Praise of All or Nothing Dichotomous Categories: Why Antitrust 
Law Should Reject the Quick Look, 104 GEO. L.J. 835, 837 (2016). 
74 Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 102. (“In order to preserve the character and quality of 
[college football], athletes must not be paid, must be required to attend class, and the 
like.”); Ben Strauss, 30-Year-Old Decision Could Serve as Template for N.C.A.A. Antitrust 
Case, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/14/sports/ncaabasketball/30-year-old-decision-could-
serve-as-template-for-ncaa-antitrust-case.html (“The fundamental premise of the case, as 
has been cited a number of times, is that student-athletes should not be paid.”). 
75 Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 92-94. 
76 Id. at 99 (citing the NCAA Television Committee Report). 
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member institutions began negotiating their own agreements, the NCAA 
announced that it would take disciplinary action against any member that 
entered into a separate agreement.77 The universities sued the NCAA.78 
In antitrust terms, the television restrictions were both a horizontal 
agreement not to compete and a limitation on output.79 In normal 
circumstances, these would be per se unlawful.80 However, since they 
were the product of NCAA rule-making, the Court indicated that the rule 
of reason was the proper mode of analysis.81 The issue was whether the 
television restriction had a negative effect in the market for televised 
collegiate athletics.82 If the restraint had a negative effect in the relevant 
market, then the plan violated antitrust law.83 The universities met their 
burden of establishing significant anticompetitive effects in a relevant 
market.84 The television agreement restricted their ability to sell television 
rights in the market of college football broadcasts, making the prices they 
could receive for television rights lower and the output lower than it might 
have been in a free market.85 The burden then shifted to the NCAA, which 
asserted the procompetitive effects of live, televised games, and 
competitive balance.86 Since the NCAA did not rely on these effects in 
trying to justify restraints on college basketball telecasts, the Court did not 
agree they were legitimate, and found in favor of the universities.87 
Even though the Court ruled for the universities in Board of Regents, 
supporters of the NCAA’s amateurism rules assert that the decision stands 
for the proposition that the NCAA’s role is to preserve and maintain the 
tradition of amateurism in college athletics and it can impose restrictions 
to protect amateurism.88 In the opinion, Justice Stevens opined that “the 
role of the NCAA must be to preserve a tradition that might otherwise 
die.”89 Further, “in order to preserve the character and quality of [college 
sports], athletes must not be paid, must be required to attend class, and the 
like.”90 Thus, from the NCAA’s perspective, Board of Regents can be 
understood to support the proposition that even though amateurism is not 
 
77 Id. at 94-95. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 99-100. 
80 Id. at 100. 
81 Id. at 103. 
82 See id. at 95. 
83 Id. at 95-96. 
84 Id. at 112-13. 
85 Id. at 105-07, 112-13. 
86 Id. at 117. 
87 Id. 
88 See id. at 102, 120. 
89 Id. at 120. 
90 Id. at 102. 
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perfect, it is a reasonable justification for some restrictions as long as the 
restrictions further educational objectives of the organization and its 
purpose of preserving the character and quality of intercollegiate 
athletics.91 However, most court decisions that have defended amateurism 
and the NCAA’s educational objectives as justifications for restraints rely 
on Board of Regents. Thus, if Stevens’ language was to ever be challenged, 
then every case upon which the NCAA relied on the language to uphold 
amateurism based restrictions would be contested.92 The Northern District 
of California dealt with this issue in O’Bannon v. NCAA. 
B. O’Bannon 
In July 2009, Ed O’Bannon, a former basketball player for UCLA, 
filed suit against the NCAA.93 Recognizing that his image was being used 
in a video game for which he was not being compensated, O’Bannon 
argued that the NCAA violated antitrust law by forbidding student-athletes 
from being compensated for the use of their names, images, and likeness 
in broadcasts.94 O’Bannon alleged that the NCAA fixed the amount 
student-athletes are paid for their name, image, and likeness at zero and 
prohibited student-athletes from accessing the market.95 He sought to 
restrain the NCAA from creating and enforcing rules that restrict Division 
I football and basketball players’ ability to receive “any compensation, 
beyond the value of their athletic scholarships for the use of their names, 
images, and likeness in videogames, live game telecasts, re-broadcasts, 
and archival game footage.”96 
As with most antitrust lawsuits against the NCAA, O’Bannon would 
turn on the second prong of the Sherman Act, whether the agreement 
restrained trade unreasonably.97 At trial, the plaintiffs met their burden of 
showing that the NCAA created significant anticompetitive effects in a 
relevant market.98 The burden then shifted to the NCAA to show that the 
 
91 McDavis, supra note 4, at 307. 
92 Id. at 308. 
93 O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 962-63 (N.D. Cal. 
2014). 
94 Steve Elder & Ben Strauss, Understanding Ed O’Bannon’s Suit Against the N.C.A.A., 
N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/10/sports/ncaabasketball/understanding-ed-obannons-
suit-against-the-ncaa.html. 
95 Third Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint, In re NCAA Student-Athlete 
Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., No. C 09-01967 CW, 2013 WL 3810438, at 14, (N.D. 
Cal. July 19, 2013). 
96 O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 985. 
97 McDavis, supra note 4, at 310. 
98 O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 999. 
82 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:70 
 
compensation restrictions were justified.99 Although noting faulty 
reasoning in many of its arguments,100 the court ultimately found that the 
NCAA met its burden through two justifications: amateurism and the 
integration of academics and athletics.101 Thus, the burden shifted back to 
the plaintiffs to establish that these justifications could be accomplished 
through a less restrictive means.102 
The plaintiffs identified two legitimate less restrictive alternative 
measures: (1) permit schools to allow scholarships to cover the full cost of 
attendance at any Division I school; and (2) allow schools to hold limited 
and equal shares of licensing revenues in a trust to be distributed to athletes 
after their eligibility is up.103 The court found that these were reasonable 
alternative measures and that the practice of prohibiting payments to 
athletes violated antitrust law.104 However, for the second alternative, the 
court noted that the NCAA could still cap name, image, and likeness trusts 
at $5,000 per year.105 The court highlighted that NCAA broadcast expert 
Neal Pilson admitted he “would not be troubled”  by $5,000 payments to 
athletes since consumers would continue to patronize intercollegiate 
athletics even if athletes were paid that amount.106 
In September 2015, the Ninth Circuit heard the case. On appeal, the 
NCAA relied on Board of Regents, arguing that the decision established 
that amateurism restrictions are “presumptively valid.”107 However, the 
Ninth Circuit reasoned that the decision only discussed amateurism rules 
in the context of the rule of reason, as an important factor distinguishing 
the market for collegiate athletics from the market for professional 
athletics, and noted that the television restrictions challenged in Board of 
Regents had nothing to do with amateurism.108. Therefore, the language in 
Board of Regents regarding amateurism is dicta that will be given 
deference “[w]here applicable.”109 
 
99 Id. 
100 The NCAA relied on Board of Regents to argue that its compensation restrictions 
promote consumer demand by preserving its tradition of amateurism and identity of college 
sports. However, the court rejected the argument and found that the Board of Regents 
language stating that student-athletes cannot be paid did not serve to resolve any disputed 
issues of law in the case and “was not based on any factual findings.” The court decided 
that Stevens’ language was an “incidental phrase” that did not establish compensation 
restrictions as procompetitive. Id. at 999-1000. 
101 Id. at 1004. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 1005. 
104 See id. at 983-84. 
105 Id. at 1008. 
106 Id. at 983. 
107 O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1063 (9th Cir. 2015). 
108 Id. (citing Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984)). 
109 Id. 
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Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court’s holdings 
regarding the justifications.110 The restrictions on compensation play a role 
in integrating academics with athletics and preserving consumer demand 
by promoting amateurism.111 In evaluating the legitimacy of the plaintiffs’ 
less restrictive alternatives, the Ninth Circuit relied heavily on Stevens’ 
contention in Board of Regents that the NCAA must be afforded ‘ample 
latitude’ to superintend college athletics.112 Affording the NCAA that 
deference, the Ninth Circuit made clear that only a “strong evidentiary 
showing” that the proposed alternative is “virtually as effective” at 
achieving the justification is sufficient to satisfy the plaintiff’s final 
burden.113 
On the first alternative to restricting compensation – allowing schools 
to offer full cost of attendance scholarships – the Ninth Circuit held that 
the plaintiffs met their burden.114 Thus, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s finding that restricting scholarships to only grant-in-aid 
violated antitrust law.115 As for the other alternative – paying athletes cash 
compensation and holding licensing revenues in a trust to be distributed to 
athletes after their eligibility is up – the Ninth Circuit reversed the district 
court.116 Referring to the ample latitude the NCAA must be afforded, the 
Ninth Circuit held that “the [r]ule of [r]eason requires that the NCAA 
permit its schools to provide up to the cost of attendance to their student 
athletes. It does not require more.”117 
Judge Thomas, the Chief Judge for the Ninth Circuit, dissented with 
the majority’s conclusion that payments of up to $5,000 in deferred 
compensation above student-athletes’ full cost of attendance should not be 
allowed.118 Thomas argued that the majority erred in dismissing the 
testimony of Neal Pilson, who stated that paying student-athletes $5,000 
per year in a trust would not significantly impact consumer demand, and 
of Dr. Daniel Rascher, who testified that consumer demand in rugby, 
tennis, and the Olympics increased after the sports’ governing boards 
allowed athletes to be paid.119 Importantly, Thomas asserted that “in terms 
 
110 Id. at 1074. 
111 Id. at 1073. 
112 Id. at 1074 (citing Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 
(1984)). 
113 Id. at 1074, 1076. 
114 Id. at 1075-76. 
115 Id. 
116 See id. at 1076. 
117 Id. at 1079. 
118 Id. (Thomas, J., concurring and dissenting in part) 
119 Id. at 1080-81. 
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of antitrust analysis, the concept of amateurism is relevant only insofar as 
it relates to consumer interest.”120 
The decision in O’Bannon established two important principles. First, 
student-athletes are allowed to receive compensation equal to the cost of 
attendance at their respective institution.121 Second, Board of Regents does 
not give the NCAA point blank authority to enforce compensation 
restrictions and justify them with amateurism.122 As Judge Thomas 
implied in the dissent, amateurism is a relevant inquiry only to the extent 
that it impacts consumer interest.123 Thus, it is only an appropriate 
justification if it protects the distinctness of the NCAA’s product and if the 
benefits to athletes would ruin consumer demand.124 As we will see, Judge 
Thomas had an opportunity to vindicate this view in Alston. O’Bannon is 
still critical to law on athlete compensation today. However, a landmark 
decision in March 2019 by the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of California, upheld by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in May 2020, reaffirmed the proposition that 
the NCAA’s rules governing the grant-in-aid or scholarships that schools 
offer athletes constitute a restraint on trade.125 The next section discusses 
In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust 
Litigation (Alston)126 and its implications on athlete compensation in 
collegiate athletics. 
C. Alston 
Since O’Bannon, several Division I athletes have challenged the 
compensation restrictions that the NCAA relies on to protect amateurism. 
In Alston, the lead plaintiffs, Shawne Alston, a former West Virginia 
running back, and Justine Hartman, a former Cal women’s basketball 
player, sought to eliminate all of the NCAA’s restrictions on student-
athlete compensation, creating a free market where conferences have the 
option to offer compensation packages to recruits.127 Observing that the 
 
120 Id. at 1081. 
121 Id. at 1074. 
122 Id. at 1061. 
123 See Id. 
124 See id. 
125 In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 958 
F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2020); In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap 
Antitrust Litig., 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2019). 
126 In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 375 
F. Supp. 3d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2019). 
127 John Wolohan, A further anti-trust challenge to the NCAA’s athlete compensation cap 
(In Re: NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap..), LAWINSPORT (April 11, 2019), 
https://www.lawinsport.com/topics/item/a-further-anti-trust-challenge-to-the-ncaa-s-
athlete-compensation-cap-in-re-ncaa-athletic-grant-in-aid-cap#references. 
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allegations made by the plaintiffs were nearly identical to the allegations 
made by O’Bannon, the NCAA moved to dismiss the claim under the 
doctrine of stare decisis.128 Judge Claudia Wilken, who presided in the 
district court in O’Bannon and made the initial decision of allowing cash 
payments to athletes, denied the NCAA’s motion.129 
After the court denied the NCAA’s motion, both parties moved for 
summary judgment.130 As in O’Bannon, the NCAA’s motion was 
premised on amateurism being significant to consumer appeal for 
collegiate athletics and the NCAA being afforded ample latitude to protect 
it.131 The motion was denied.132 The plaintiffs argued that the NCAA’s 
approach to restricting financial aid was inconsistent: in some cases, aid 
was limited to the cost of attendance.133 In others, aid exceeded the cost of 
attendance.134 Thus, the restrictions were restraints that create unjustified 
anticompetitive effects.135 In response, the NCAA asserted the two 
justifications that survived in O’Bannon: integration of academics and 
athletics136 and preservation of consumer demand for the product by 
 
128 Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Support Thereof, In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid 
Cap Antitrust Litig., No. 14MD02541, 2016 WL 4943915 (N.D. Cal. 2016). 
129 Order Denying Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic 
Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., No. 14-md-2541-CW, 2016 WL 4154855 
(N.D. Cal. 2016). 
130 Plaintiffs’ Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary Judgement; Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in Support Thereof, In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic 
Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (No. 14-md-
02541 CW).; Defendants’ Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary Judgment and for 
Exclusion of Expert Testimony, and Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary 
Judgment; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof, In 
re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 375 F. Supp. 
3d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (No. 14-md-02541 CW). 
131 Defendants’ Notice of Motion and Motion for Summary Judgment and for Exclusion 
of Expert Testimony, and Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment; 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof at 39-45,  In re NCAA Athletic 
Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig. (Alston), 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (No. 
14-md-02541 CW). 
132 Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, In 
re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig,  In re NCAA 
Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig. (Alston), 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2019) 
(No. 14-md-02541 CW). 
133 See Id. at *9. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at *7. 
136 On appeal, the NCAA abandoned this justification. The only justification that 
survived was preservation of consumer demand. In re Nat’l Collegiate 
Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 958 F.3d 1239, 1249 n.8 (9th 
Cir. 2020). 
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promoting amateurism.137 The court found a factual dispute and held that 
these justifications would have to be proved at trial.138 
Responding to the justifications, the plaintiffs offered two less 
restrictive alternatives: (1) allow conferences to set rules for education and 
athletic participation expenses that member institutions can provide; and 
(2) eliminate all rules prohibiting payments of any kind related to 
educational expenses and payments that are incidental to athletic 
participation.139 In reviewing the athletes’ claims at trial, the court applied 
a rule of reason analysis.140 Having identified the relevant market of 
Division I intercollegiate athletics, the court established that the NCAA 
and its member schools effectively have monopsony power to restrain 
athletes’ compensation without risk of diminishing their market power.141 
The NCAA wields monopsony power because college football and 
basketball lack elite viable alternative competitions.142 To attend college 
and compete in athletics at such a level, athletes must accept the NCAA’s 
compensation rules, regardless of whether the rules accurately reflect the 
competitive value of their services.143 Thus, the plaintiffs established 
significant anticompetitive effects in a relevant market.144 
The burden then shifted to the NCAA to provide legitimate 
procompetitive justifications for the restraint.145 The NCAA argued that 
the restraint was justified since amateurism remains significant to the 
consumer demand for college athletics.146 Specifically, if student-athletes 
were not amateurs, attendance at games, TV ratings, and revenues would 
drop.147 In support of the justification, the NCAA contended that 
consumers enjoy college sports because they are an alternative form of 
entertainment to professional sports, and that the levels of competition 
differ due to the amounts and types of compensation players receive.148 
The court, however, found that the distinction between college and 
professional sports primarily lies in college athletes not receiving 
 
137 Alston, 2018 WL 1524005, at *8. 
138 Id. (citing O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1064 (9th Cir. 
2015)). 
139 Id. at *12-13. 
140 In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 375 
F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1066 (N.D. Cal. 2019). 




145 See Id. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. at 1082. 
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unlimited cash payments, especially those unrelated to education 
expenses.149 
The court concluded that some of the NCAA’s compensation rules 
may have an effect on preserving consumer demand for college sports as 
distinct from professional sports to the extent that they prevent unlimited 
cash payments unrelated to education expenses.150 The challenged 
compensation limits can be divided into three categories: (1) the limit on 
the grant-in-aid at not less than the cost of attendance; (2) compensation 
and benefits unrelated to education paid on top of a grant-in-aid; and (3) 
compensation and benefits related to education provided on top of a grant-
in-aid.151 The court found that the limits in the first and second categories 
have a procompetitive effect related to having limits, and help maintain 
consumer demand for intercollegiate athletics as a distinct product by 
preventing cash payments unrelated to education.152 As for the third 
category, the court found that the NCAA’s limits on benefits related to 
education (e.g., scholarships for graduate programs) do not have an effect 
on enhancing consumer demand for college sports.153 
The burden then shifted back to the plaintiffs to show that the 
justifications could be accomplished through a substantially less restrictive 
means.154 The plaintiffs proposed the alternative of eliminating all rules 
prohibiting payments of any kind related to educational expenses and 
payments that are incidental to athletic participation.155 In finding this 
alternative to be less restrictive, the court held that providing additional 
education-related benefits would be less harmful to competition in the 
relevant market.156 Specifically, the types of benefits that should not be 
limited by the NCAA “include items like computers, science equipment, 
musical instruments, and other items not currently included in the cost of 
attendance calculation but nonetheless related to the pursuit of various 
academic studies.”157 Also included would be “post-eligibility 
scholarships to complete undergraduate or graduate degrees at any school; 
scholarships to attend vocational school; expenses for pre- and post-
eligibility tutoring; expenses related to studying abroad that are not 
covered by the cost of attendance; and paid post-eligibility internships.”158 
 
149 Id. at 1083. 
150 Id. at 1101. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. at 1102. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. at 1086. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. at 1087. 
157 Id. at 1088. 
158 Id. 
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The court found that the alternative rules would only expand education-
related compensation and benefits, without resulting in cash payments, 
unrelated to education, like payments in professional sports.159 In addition, 
the NCAA would still have the right to define the education-related 
benefits and create rules on how schools provide them to athletes.160 
On May 18, 2020, a three-judge panel for the Ninth Circuit upheld the 
district court’s decision that the NCAA cannot restrict colleges from 
providing “non-cash education-related benefits” to athletes in Division I 
of the Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS).161 Judge Thomas, who dissented 
with the majority’s conclusion in O’Bannon that payments of up to $5,000 
in deferred compensation above student-athletes’ full cost of attendance 
are not permissible, wrote for the panel.162 
The panel reviewed the less restrictive alternative identified by the 
district court163 and found that the court did not err in determining that it 
would be “virtually as effective” in serving the procompetitive purposes 
of the NCAA’s rules because such an alternative would not have a 
negative effect on consumer demand.164 In reaching this conclusion, the 
panel discussed the district court’s reliance on Dr. Rascher’s testimony 
about a University of Nebraska program that permits student-athletes to 
receive up to $7,500 in post-eligibility aid (for study-abroad expenses, 
scholarships, and internships) which the University’s former chancellor 
conceded did not erode demand, the expansion of SAF and AEF payments, 
and a Student-Athletes’ survey which indicated that consumers would 
continue to patronize college sports even if student-athletes received 
academic or graduation incentive payments of up to $10,000.165 Keeping 
these expansions of benefits in mind, the panel concluded that the district 
court fairly found that the NCAA’s compensation limits preserve demand 
only to the extent that they prevent unlimited cash payments akin to 
professional salaries.166 
In addition, the plaintiffs’ attorneys requested that the court expand 
the district court’s ruling and allow colleges to compensate athletes in any 
 
159 Id. at 1088-89. 
160 Wolohan, supra note 127. 
161 In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 958 
F.3d 1239, 1239 (9th Cir. 2020). 
162 Id. at 1242. 
163 The less restrictive alternative “would prohibit the NCAA from (i) capping certain 
education-related benefits and (ii) limiting academic or graduation awards or benefits 
below the maximum amount that an individual may receive in athletic participation awards, 
while (iii) permitting individual conferences to set limits on education-related benefits.” 
Id. at 1260 (citing Alston, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1087). 
164 Id. 
165 Id. at 1250. 
166 Id. at 1260. 
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manner, rather than limiting the options to education-related expenses.167 
The panel declined to broaden the scope of the district court’s ruling. In 
reaching its conclusion on this matter, the panel discussed the Fair Pay for 
Play Act, enacted in California in 2019.168 The law will go into effect in 
January 2023, and allows college athletes in California to be paid for use 
of their name, image, and likeness.169 The plaintiffs argued that the 
NCAA’s creation of a group to explore name, image, and likeness benefits 
invalidates the argument that benefits would diminish the amateurism 
model, and therefore the NCAA, in prohibiting pure cash compensation, 
can no longer rely on O’Bannon’s conclusion that limits on cash payments 
untethered to education are critical to preserving consumer demand.170 
However, the panel said this argument was “premature” and “the NCAA 
has not endorsed cash compensation untethered to education.”171 
Although the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s ruling for the 
student-athletes in Alston, many argue the decision is a victory for the 
NCAA since a free-market for the athletes’ services has not been 
established. However, in concluding that some pure cash payments for 
non-education reasons and payments to athletes for products and services 
used for education beyond the cost of attendance would not erode 
consumer demand, the panel did what the Ninth Circuit in O’Bannon 
prohibited. The next section analyzes this decision. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. The Ninth Circuit Properly Decided Alston 
Proponents of athletes’ rights argue that student-athletes were the 
losers in Alston since it did not create a free market for their services. 
However, student-athletes still benefitted from Alston since the Ninth 
Circuit exceeded what it disallowed in O’Bannon. Specifically, the Ninth 
Circuit concluded that SAF and AEF payments and other above cost of 
attendance payments,172 are allowed even in spite of the “Not One Penny” 
 
167 See id. at 1265. 
168 Id. at 1252. 
169 See id. 
170 Id. at 1265. 
171 Id. 
172 “Without losing their eligibility, student-athletes may receive, for instance: (i) awards 
valued at several hundred dollars for athletic performance (“athletic participation 
awards”) . . . (ii) disbursements—sometimes thousands of dollars—from the NCAA’s 
Student Assistance Fund (“SAF”) and Academic Enhancement Fund (“AEF”) for a variety 
of purposes, such as academic achievement or graduation awards, school supplies, tutoring, 
study-abroad expenses, post-eligibility financial aid, health and safety expenses, clothing, 
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standard. Relying on expert testimony and distinguishing these payments 
from professional salaries, the Court concluded that they would not 
negatively impact consumer demand, and therefore are permissible in 
intercollegiate athletics.173 For the following reasons, the Ninth Circuit 
properly upheld the district court’s findings. 
1. Student-Athletes’ Rights are Growing 
Even though Alston did not establish a free market, student athletes’ 
rights and the benefits afforded to them continue to grow. Some of the 
ways conferences and the NCAA have modified rules after O’Bannon and 
Alston are detailed below. 
a. Athletic Scholarships Receive Greater Protection 
Now 
Although the NCAA does not require schools to offer guaranteed 
multi-year scholarships to athletes, the practice of offering four-year 
scholarships is more common now than it was before O’Bannon and 
Alston.174 After O’Bannon, the NCAA Division I “Power Five” Schools 
and Notre Dame implemented a rule that precludes student-athletes from 
having their athletic scholarships terminated or not renewed for any 
athletics reason.175 Even though non-Power Five schools are not required 
to follow this rule, its implementation was significant for reasons including 
over-signing at powerhouse Division I football programs. Over-signing 
occurs when college athletic departments sign more prospective student-
athletes to National Letters of Intent than the maximum number of 
 
travel, “personal or family expenses,” loss-of-value insurance policies, car repair, personal 
legal services, parking tickets, and magazine subscriptions . . . (iv) mandatory medical care 
(available for at least two years after the athlete graduates) for an athletics-related injury 
. . . .” Id. at 1244-45. 
173 Id. at 1260. 
174 See Jon Solomon, Schools can give out 4-year athletic scholarships, but many don’t, 
CBS SPORTS (Sep. 16, 2014), https://www.cbssports.com/college-football/news/schools-
can-give-out-4-year-athletic-scholarships-but-many-dont/. 
175 Termination or non-renewal of an athletic scholarship is allowed if an athlete (1) is 
ruled ineligible for competition, (2) provides fraudulent information on an application, 
letter of intent, or financial aid agreement, (3) voluntarily quits their team, (4) engages in 
serious misconduct that rises to the level of being disciplined by the university’s regular 
student disciplinary board, or (5) violates a university policy or rule which is not related to 
athletic conditions or ability, but a coach cannot take away an athlete’s scholarship for poor 
athletic performance. Rick Allen, The Facts About “Guaranteed” Multi-Year NCAA DI 
Scholarships, INFORMED ATHLETE (June 12, 2016), https://informedathlete.com/the-facts-
about-guaranteed-multi-year-ncaa-di-scholarships/. 
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scholarships permitted by NCAA rules.176 It typically occurs in two ways: 
a school could sign a number of National Letters of Intent that may bring 
its total number of counters177 above the NCAA limit of eighty-five; or a 
school could sign more than twenty-five National Letters of Intent during 
the period between National Signing Day and May 31.178 
This rule enhancing the protection of athletic scholarships prevents 
unfair practices like over-signing since a coach cannot terminate or fail to 
renew an athletic scholarship for underperformance or medical reasons. 
Therefore, a coach is not incentivized to sign more players than he or she 
is permitted by NCAA rules. Although the rule does not guarantee athlete 
pay, it provides athletes with protection they weren’t afforded prior to 
O’Bannon. 
b. Alston Could Motivate Student-Athletes to Pursue 
Graduate Degrees 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Alston represents a significant increase 
in student-athletes’ rights for two reasons. First, the NCAA cannot limit 
benefits student-athletes are allowed to receive as long as they are related 
to education.179 Although the NCAA would be permitted to create rules 
defining the benefits student-athletes can receive and how they can receive 
them, within the category of types of benefits that can no longer be limited 
by the NCAA are “other items not currently included in the cost of 
attendance calculation but nonetheless related to the pursuit of academic 
studies.”180 The language is open-ended and depending on interpretation, 
could result in massive increases in benefits to athletes. 
Second, student-athletes are now entitled to post-eligibility 
scholarships to complete undergraduate or graduate degrees at any school 
and scholarships to attend vocational school.181 Due to the time 
commitment required, costs, and difficulty of obtaining a graduate degree 
relative to an undergraduate degree, it is fair to assume that in the past, few 
student-athletes would have opted to pursue a graduate degree without 
 
176 See Timothy Threadcraft, Oversigning: The unexamined immoraility of the SEC, 
YALE NEWS (Nov. 16, 2011), https://yaledailynews.com/blog/2011/11/16/oversigning-the-
unexamined-immorality-of-the-sec/. 
177 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 39, art. 15.02.3, at 202 (“A counter is an 
individual who is receiving institutional financial aid that is countable against the aid 
limitations in the sport.”). 
178 See Threadcraft, supra note 176. 
179 In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 958 
F.3d 1239, 1252 (9th Cir. 2020). 
180 In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 375 
F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1088 (N.D. Cal. 2019). 
181 In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 958 
F.3d at 1251. 
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financial aid. With scholarship money on the table now, more could opt to 
pursue graduate degrees in the future. Given that Alston increases the 
education benefits and money available to athletes, it continues to expand 
the benefits that they can receive. 
2. Inequity of Illegal Restraints of Trade 
In Alston, the Ninth Circuit upheld the finding in O’Bannon that the 
NCAA’s rules governing athletic scholarships that schools offer constitute 
an illegal price-fixing agreement in restraint of trade.182 However, the 
agreements are allowed because the NCAA’s structure necessitates a 
“certain degree of cooperation.”183 
Price-fixing occurs when competitors agree to raise, lower, or stabilize 
prices or competitive terms.184 Since customers choose what products and 
services to buy, and expect prices to be determined freely on the basis of 
supply and demand (not competitively fixed), antitrust law generally 
requires that companies establish prices and other terms on their own, 
without agreeing with competitors.185 Applying this idea to college 
athletics, horizontal price fixing occurs if conferences and schools agree 
to not pay athletes with the understanding that it would lead to fairness and 
competitiveness across the board.186 Considering that the NCAA is a 
conglomerate of horizontal competitors and it caps the benefits athletes 
receive for participating in sports, there is no dispute that the NCAA 
engages in price-fixing. However, because of the degree of cooperation 
required by the NCAA’s structure, courts have never subjected scholarship 
agreements to a per se analysis.187 In spite of this, the Ninth Circuit’s 
affirmation of O’Bannon and recognition of the illegality of scholarship 
agreements in Alston is significant. Certainly, Alston stuck to the guns of 
earlier decisions, distinguishing the legality of awards such as Pell Grants, 
which are intended for education-related expenses, from pure cash 
 
182 In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 958 
F.3d 1239, 1254 (9th Cir. 2020). 
183 In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 375 
F. Supp. at 1066. 
184 Price Fixing, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-
guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/dealings-competitors/price-fixing. 
185 Id. 
186 Hayes Rule, A breakdown of Alston v. NCAA: What is the future of paying college 
athletes, and what would it mean for athletes to be paid? THE BEARFACED TRUTH (May 4, 
2019), https://medium.com/the-bearfaced-truth/a-breakdown-of-alston-v-ncaa-what-is-
the-future-of-paying-college-athletes-3483569905b4. 
187 See In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 
375 F. Supp. at 1066. 
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compensation.188 However, the recognition of the inequity of scholarship 
agreements by the O’Bannon and Alston courts indicates that this issue is 
on the horizon. Although the modification of scholarship agreements will 
have to occur within the confines of recent decisions, the recognition of 
these issues suggests that this may be the first of many incremental 
changes to the NCAA’s model in the foreseeable future. 
3. Additional Changes Coming? 
As student-athletes benefitted from Alston in the ways discussed in 
this section, the NCAA, which consistently contends that student-athlete 
compensation will destroy consumer demand for its product, benefitted in 
the sense that the panel did not broaden the district court’s holding to 
incorporate unlimited cash payments to student-athletes. In its review of 
the district court’s decision in Alston, the Ninth Circuit may not have 
necessarily felt that allowing athlete pay for name, image, and likeness 
would destroy consumer demand. However, there are still hurdles that 
student-athletes must overcome before a free market can be properly 
incorporated in NCAA’s model. 
Although name, image, and likeness pay does not yet fit into the 
NCAA’s model, Division I athletics may be trending in that direction. In 
1984, Justice Stevens opined in Board of Regents that the NCAA should 
be afforded “ample latitude” to superintend college athletics,189 and that 
“athletes must not be paid.”190 Although the Court ruled against the 
NCAA, the NCAA has incessantly relied on this dictum over the years in 
arguing that restraints should be allowed to protect consumer demand. In 
2015, the Ninth Circuit upheld the Northern District of California’s ruling 
in O’Bannon in part. Specifically, it affirmed that Stevens’ language in 
Board of Regents is only applicable in specific instances and permitted 
universities to offer athletes cost of attendance scholarships.191 In Alston, 
the panel upheld O’Bannon and eliminated the cap on education-related 
benefits to athletes.192 Recently, the NCAA President and Board of 
Governors appointed a task force to examine issues highlighted in recently 
proposed federal and state legislation related to student-athlete name, 
 
188 In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 958 
F.3d 1239, 1255 (9th Cir. 2020). 
189 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984). 
190 Id. at 102. 
191 See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 1000-01 (N.D. 
Cal. 2014). 
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image, and likeness.193 With courts becoming more lenient in affording 
benefits to student-athletes, and the NCAA beginning to examine how 
name, image, and likeness pay can properly fit into its model, courts and 
state legislatures may ultimately determine payments of this type should 
be permitted, and significant change may be forthcoming. 
At this point in time, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Alston strikes the 
best possible balance between the financial and educational interests of all 
parties. Eliminating the cap on education-related benefits continues 
expanding benefits available to athletes while maintaining the consumer 
demand for the NCAA’s distinct product. However, with experts 
continuing to present evidence that payments to athletes of higher value 
would not substantially impact consumer demand, and states beginning to 
establish legislation for athlete pay, it may only be a matter of time before 
things change for good.  The next section discusses what Alston could 
mean in the future, considers long-term solutions to restraints on student-
athlete compensation, and analyzes issues which ultimately will require 
change to be incremental. 
B. Application & Long-Term Solutions 
Under the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Alston, universities, if permitted 
by their conferences, can provide student-athletes with benefits that further 
their education, such as computers and other devices.194 However, the 
Ninth Circuit and courts across the country have not yet allowed athletes 
to receive name, image, and likeness pay.195 
As discussed in the previous section, O’Bannon and Alston represent 
an increase in student-athletes’ rights. Because of the holdings of these 
cases, student-athletes may now receive benefits they weren’t afforded in 
the past. Furthermore, in 2019, the NCAA’s top governing board 
voted unanimously to allow student-athletes the opportunity to benefit 
from the use of their name, image, and likeness in a manner consistent 
with the collegiate model, and the NCAA appointed a task force to 
examine name, image, and likeness pay.196 Specifically, Michael Drake, 
 
193 Michelle Brutlag Hosick, NCAA Working Group to Examine Name, Image, and 
Likeness, NCAA (May 14, 2019), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-
center/news/ncaa-working-group-examine-name-image-and-likeness. 
194 In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 958 
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the Chair of the Board of Governors and President of The Ohio State 
University, said: 
”We must embrace change to provide the best possible 
experience for college athletes. Additional flexibility in 
this area can and must continue to support college sports 
as a part of higher education. This modernization for the 
future is a natural extension of the numerous steps NCAA 
members have taken in recent years to improve support 
for student-athletes, including full cost of 
attendance and guaranteed scholarships.”197 
The Board asserted that the modernization of collegiate athletics 
would have to occur within a specific set of principles and guidelines.198 
Because of the O’Bannon and Alston decisions, the number of antitrust 
lawsuits that continue to be brought against the NCAA, and complaints of 
the exploitative practices of the institution, the NCAA has been compelled 
to modify its rules to ensure fairness for student-athletes.199 A number of 
ideas have been proposed for modernizing college athletics. This 
Comment examines three. 
1. Free Market 
a. How it Would Work 
If collegiate athletics became a free market, the NCAA’s restraints on 
athlete compensation would be eliminated. With a free market approach, 
the NCAA could replace its current rules with one rule: “NCAA student-
athletes must be enrolled at the school and in good academic standing 
when practicing with an NCAA-sanctioned team or playing in an NCAA-
sanctioned event.”200 In other words, student-athletes would be treated like 
all other students. If a school wanted to pay players a market rate, it could. 
If a booster wanted to buy a player a car or contribute to his salary, he 
could.201 The idea behind the free market model is to make the NCAA 
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b. Pros 
Fairness motivates rule makers, the NCAA, and state legislative 
bodies to consider granting college athletes access to the marketplace. 
Under the NCAA’s current rules, college students can use their talent or 
skills to earn a living while in school, but athletes cannot.203 If athletes are 
paid, they would lose their scholarships and be banned from competing in 
collegiate athletics, likely forcing many of them to drop out of school.204 
Despite the fact that their skills generate billions of dollars each year for 
their schools, the NCAA, corporate sponsors, and television networks, 
athletes continue to be treated this way.205 
Proponents of athletes’ rights argue that the NCAA’s practice of 
prohibiting athletes from accessing the marketplace is unfair.206 This 
practice violates the tenet of the United States’ free market economic 
system that people should be permitted to receive pay for their hard work 
and talent.207 Athletes could be fairly compensated for what they 
contribute to their school and the NCAA by negotiating endorsement 
agreements and being paid salaries by donors.208 
While courts and the NCAA continue to prohibit athletes from 
accessing the market, states have started proposing legislation that would 
overrule the NCAA’s anti-competitive rules and grant athletes the right to 
participate in the free market, like other college students can.209 California 
recently passed Senate Bill 206, the Fair Pay to Play Act.210 Similar 
legislation was proposed in Colorado and a bipartisan bill was introduced 
by Congress.211 As states continue passing laws giving athletes the right to 
profit from their name, image, and likeness, the NCAA may be forced to 
adjust its rules to remain afloat. Allowing access to the marketplace is a 
solution. 
c. Cons 
At this point in time, the cons of the free market idea may outweigh 
the pros for a few reasons. In Alston, the lower court asserted that the 
distinction between college and professional sports primarily lies in 
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student-athletes not receiving unlimited cash payments.212 It is possible 
that a free market could harm consumer demand for the NCAA’s product 
since athletes would inevitably receive cash payments from agents, 
businesses, and schools for their services. Under this type of model, 
recruiting would become a competitive bidding process. With no limits on 
what schools could provide, donors would contribute more to recruiting, 
and schools and coaches would dive into these funds to make the best 
offers to talented prospects. In addition, athletes could sign endorsement 
deals and be paid salaries by their universities. If this were to occur, the 
distinction noted by the lower court in Alston would be destroyed. It 
remains to be seen whether this would have an adverse effect on consumer 
demand, however, the NCAA has noted that this is a massive concern. 
Significantly, the free market could also harm college athletics since 
only big schools with rich donors that generate significant revenues from 
ticket and merchandise sales and publicity could compete for the best 
players. In other words, the free market could put schools which cannot 
pay for the best recruits out of business. However, it’s arguable that both 
college football and basketball are already dominated by the schools that 
recruit the best players. Each year, the same ten or so college football 
teams have top-rated recruiting classes, and the same six – Alabama, LSU, 
Georgia, Oklahoma, Ohio State, and Clemson – typically compete for 
spots in the College Football Playoff. This is also observed in college 
basketball, where teams that recruit the best players – Duke, Kansas, North 
Carolina, Kentucky, and Michigan State – regularly compete for 
conference championships and #1 and #2 seeds in the NCAA Tournament. 
If athletes were given access to the market, the best recruits would likely 
still choose to attend the schools that recruit the best players now, since 
only those schools could generate enough revenue to compete for these 
players. Even so, the free market idea likely isn’t accomplishable until it 
can be shown that unlimited payments to student-athletes would not have 
a significant impact on demand. Modernization and incremental 
adjustments to rules may be required before this can become a reality. 
2. Universal Stipends for Athletes 
The NCAA could solve its problem with athlete compensation by 
allowing schools to provide stipends to all athletes, regardless of the 
amount in revenue they generate for the school.213 The payments would be 
 
212 In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 375 
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shared equally, on the basis of hours of effort put in.214 Providing universal 
stipends to athletes may sound like a reasonable solution to the 
compensation issue. Every athlete, whether on the football, basketball, or 
tennis team, would be paid equally based on the time they put into their 
sport. If the alternative was not receiving a stipend at all, athletes would 
support this idea. However, there is a significant problem with universal 
stipends that likely prohibits this type of measure from being 
implemented: fairness. 
For instance, during the 2012-2013 college basketball season, 
University of Indiana won twenty-nine games and the Big Ten regular 
season title, was a #1 seed in the NCAA Tournament, and advanced to the 
Sweet Sixteen.215 Indiana’s best player was Victor Oladipo, who was 
selected as the second overall pick in the 2013 NBA Draft and is still a 
starter in the NBA. As a member of the 2012-2013 Indiana team, Oladipo 
produced 7.37 wins which, was estimated to be about $737,129 in 
revenue.216 Will Sheehey also played for Indiana and contributed 22.3 
minutes per game, 9.5 points, and 3.5 rebounds. Sheehey produced 2.42 
wins for Indiana, which was estimated to be about $242,386 in revenue.217 
If student-athletes were to receive universal stipends, Sheehey and 
Oladipo would be compensated equally, based on hours of effort put in. 
Although Oladipo generated nearly three times as much revenue for 
Indiana as Sheehey, both would be paid the same amount. The universal 
stipend becomes an even bigger problem when you consider that walk-
ons, who typically do not play as much as highly rated recruits and in turn 
fail to generate as much revenue, would also be paid as much as the best 
players.218 
The problem with universal stipends is also encountered at the 
professional level in the U.S. Soccer Equal Pay lawsuit.219 Female soccer 
players earned a $15,000 bonus for the World Cup whereas male players 
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earned $55,000.220 However, the Men’s World Cup in 2018 generated 45.8 
times more revenue than the 2019 Women’s World Cup.221 Even though 
as a team, the American women have performed better than the men in 
recent World Cups, the problem with paying men and women equal 
salaries is comparable to paying Sheehey and walk-ons as much as 
Oladipo in the Indiana example. Given the concern and difficulty with 
implementing a similar measure at the professional level, it is unlikely that 
universal stipends will become the norm at the collegiate level soon. 
3. Trust Funds: Setting Aside Revenues Until Graduation 
Perhaps the most feasible solution for modernizing amateurism while 
maintaining consumer demand is setting aside revenues until student-
athletes graduate. In 2018, Josh Rosen proposed that the NCAA modernize 
amateurism by allowing athletes to profit, after they graduate, from 
various revenue opportunities that arise during their college careers.222 The 
key element of Rosen’s proposal is a “Clearinghouse” that works with the 
NCAA and acts as an intermediary between the players and potential 
endorsers.223 The intermediary becomes an athlete’s licensing 
representative. It would negotiate on behalf of athletes with interested 
business parties and money earned for name, image, and likeness would 
go into a trust that the players can access after they graduate.224 
Under Rosen’s proposal “revenue would be generated on three tiers: 
national, regional and local agreements. It would then be distributed into 
individual player accounts; an NCAA-wide player pool; the NCAA itself; 
the clearinghouse; and a general scholarship fund that would funnel 
financial aid for academic purposes back into communities that produce 
the athletes.”225 
At the moment, Rosen’s proposal may be the best means of 
modernizing amateurism. The proposal is fair to athletes since it affords 
them revenue seeking opportunities that are not currently allowed under 
NCAA rules. In addition, it is ideal for the NCAA; if athletes do not profit 
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from revenue opportunities until after graduation, amateurism is 
preserved. Furthermore, everybody would benefit from revenue being 
distributed to a player pool, the NCAA itself, and a scholarship fund that 
could incentivize prospects to attend college. 
Although Rosen’s proposal may currently be the most achievable 
means of modernizing amateurism, it could be improved by removing the 
stipulation that athletes graduate from college to access revenues. While 
Rosen’s plan incentivizes student-athletes to earn their degrees – which 
benefits both athletes and universities in the long-run – graduating is not a 
feasible means for many elite athletes. Some athletes who play football or 
basketball in college come from low-income neighborhoods, and playing 
sports professionally affords them the opportunity to provide for their 
families. Moreover, an underclassman, or a student-athlete who has played 
three seasons of college football and is projected first-round pick in the 
NBA or NFL Draft, is not incentivized to stay in school given the prospect 
of injury, which could preclude him from signing a guaranteed 
professional contract. Therefore, removing Rosen’s graduation 
requirement, and giving players who generate significant revenues for 
their schools226 access to that revenue after they leave school, may be a 
more feasible means of resolving the problem with student-athlete 
compensation. 
C. Title IX’s Impact on Proposed Solutions 
Although each of the proposed solutions would increase the benefits 
available to student-athletes, the ability of colleges to pay athletes more 
than the grant-in-aid poses an unavoidable Title IX issue. Title IX refers 
to Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which prohibits 
colleges that receive federal funding from discriminating on the basis of 
sex.227 Since nearly every college receives federal financial assistance, 
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Title IX is almost always applicable.228 Title IX surfaces in intercollegiate 
athletics in a number of ways, and its purpose is to hold colleges 
accountable for failing to rectify sexually antagonistic environments.229 
Specifically, Title IX requires college athletic programs to provide roughly 
equal opportunities to male and female student-athletes.230 
First off, each of the proposed solutions invites Title IX challenges 
since payments to football or men’s basketball players – whether in 
scholarship dollars, trust disbursements, or cash stipends – in amounts that 
exceed what is paid to athletes on women’s teams could mean that a school 
has violated with Title IX. However, a school does not automatically fail 
to comply with Title IX simply by paying male athletes more.231 In the 
context of scholarships higher than grant-in-aid, the relevant analysis is 
complex and requires a closer look at the extent of disparity between 
scholarship values at an institution.232 Title IX does not necessarily require 
identical treatment of male and female athletes, nor does it stipulate that 
the same amount of money must be spent on both.233 Instead, the relevant 
inquiry is whether a school provides substantially equal opportunities to 
athletes of both genders.234 
Allowing a college student-athlete to make money from the use of his 
or her name, image and likeness – in other words, “free market” – is a 
proposal that has seen support from nearly every area of the country. 
However, it may pose a unique challenge to Title IX for many reasons. 
Although some have dismissed Title IX as a nonissue since payments 
would be made directly from third parties to athletes, legal experts have 
argued that an additional analysis is required before these payments are 
dismissed.235 Specifically, experts have asserted that an approval process 
requiring university involvement when student athletes engage with third 
parties may be necessary.236 Thus, to comply with Title IX, universities 
may be obligated to ensure there are equal opportunities for male and 
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Significantly, Title IX may also pose an issue to the athletic budgets 
of Division I universities.238 Since name, image, and likeness payments 
would come from third parties, the financial impact on budgets is nil.239 
However, there is not an infinite supply out there, both in terms of 
universities budgeting for additional payments to student-athletes and 
third parties making name, image, and likeness payments. It is possible, 
perhaps likely, that every payment made from a car dealer, booster, 
institutional employee, or trustee to a student-athlete will be one less 
donated to universities. And if universities see less money from the 
outside, they may be forced to cut the budgets of sports not making any 
money. A Title IX issue obviously arises where women’s sports generate 
substantially less revenue. 
Legislation expanding the ability of universities and third parties to 
pay student-athletes may also result in universities wanting to compensate 
athletes based on performance. For instance, what if a university endorsed 
a policy where male basketball players would be paid individually for 
double-doubles or all players on a team would be compensated based on 
conference and NCAA Tournament victories? Further, what if universities 
offered a significant sum for a male athlete of the year award? Because of 
Title IX, schools would be required to make substantially similar offerings 
to female athletes. It is easy to see how Title IX could stretch a university’s 
athletic budget thin; as discussed, there is not infinite supply out there, and 
if universities are not careful, there could be detrimental results. 
Since Title IX is a significant obstacle in the way of any of the 
proposed solutions, changes to college athletics will depend greatly on 
what new legislation looks like and the ideas conferences propose. 
Ultimately, legislation and solutions will have to be interpreted by courts 
and the Office of Civil Rights. Thus, even though O’Bannon, Alston, and 
proposed legislation in states point to significant modifications to 
scholarship agreements and benefits available to athletes in the future, it is 
extremely likely that change will be incremental. Because of Title IX, new 
policies will have to be specifically tailored to comply with corresponding 
rules. Moreover, since payments in what may not seem like excess 
amounts may pose a significant problem to universities’ athletic budgets, 
schools must slowly and carefully enact new policies for the benefit of 
student-athletes to avoid negative results. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
As student-athletes continue to bring antitrust challenges against 
NCAA rules, courts will be forced to make decisions that may result in the 
overhaul of the NCAA’s model. Although the alleged unfairness and 
presumed illegality of scholarship agreements requires the evolution of 
rules, further modification of the rules will come at a cost, and a significant 
question that judges will be forced to answer is whether the cost is worth 
it. In many ways, the tradition of collegiate athletics that currently exists 
is special. Fans and alumni at some schools live and die for their football 
and basketball programs. They attend home and away games, cherish 
magical runs in the NCAA Tournament, and chew their nails during close 
games against rivals. However, in areas of the country where stadiums are 
empty on game days, fans and alumni contend that the tradition is dying 
and in need of a shock to revive interest. Considering recent court 
decisions and legislation like that passed in California, the modernization 
of NCAA rules is likely to continue. What remains to be seen is how much 
more change courts are willing to allow to protect the rights of student-
athletes while still seeking to preserve the traditions of intercollegiate 
athletics as they existed in the past. 
 
Change is the law of life. And those who look only to the past or 
present are certain the miss the future.240 
- President John F. Kennedy 
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